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RECENT CASES
ADOPTION - WHERE THE MOTHER OF AN ILLEGITI-
MATE CHILD REFUSES TO PERMIT THE NATURAL
FATHER TO LEGITIMATE THE CHILD HE HAS NO
RIGHT OF "FIRST REFUSAL" AND HIS CONSENT TO
THE ADOPTION OF THE CHILD BY STRANGERS IS
UNNECESSARY; THE MOTHER'S CONSENT IS SUFFI-
CIENT RELINQUISHMENT TO AUTHORIZE THE
COURT TO ENTER A DECREE OF ADOPTION. In the
Matter of Adoption of Irby (Cal. App. 1964).
Sue, 14 years old, became pregnant by Jimmy, 17 years old, and
they decided to get married in Las Vegas. Stopping overnight en-
route they called their parents who persuaded them not to marry and
to return home. Sue's parents thereafter sequestered her and refused
Jimmy any opportunity to communicate with her. From the begin-
ning Jimmy had wanted to marry Sue, and in his efforts to persuade
Sue and her parents to permit the marriage he staged a suicide at-
tempt. As a result Jimmy came within the authority of the juvenile
court, and was placed under probation supervision. Prior to the
baby's birth he offered to pay the medical expenses and to make a
home for the child. Immediately after the birth Sue placed the child
for adoption with Mr. and Mrs. Ellis. At all times pertinent Jimmy
had declared publicly that he was the father and wanted to take the
baby into his family. At all times pertinent Sue had objected to his
taking the child. In the subsequent adoption proceeding instituted
by Mr. and Mrs. Ellis, Jimmy intervened and asked that the proceed-
ing be dismissed since he desired to raise the child himself. The trial
court, relying on California Civil Code § 230, ruled that the father's
prior acknowledgments of paternity and his offers to take the child
into his family were insufficient to legitimate the child, and his con-
sent was not, therefore, a prerequisite to the child's adoption by the
Ellis family. On appeal the court held that when the mother of an
illegitimate child refuses to permit the natural father to legitimate
the child the father has no right of "first refusal" and his consent to
adoption by others is not necessary. The mother's consent is sufficient
relinquishment to authorize the court to enter a decree of adoption.
In the Matter of Adoption of Irby, 226 Adv. Cal. App. 304, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 879 (1964).
As authority for this holding the court cited, inter alia, California
Civil Code § 230 which provides that the father of an illegitimate
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child may legitimate it by publicly acknowledging the child as his
own, taking it into his home, and treating it as his own. As indicated
by the court, Jimmy had not succeeded in adopting his son under
this statute since he had been prevented by the actions of Sue and
her parents from receiving the child into his own home and perform-
ing the other acts statutorily required.'
The court also cited California Civil Code § 224 in part, as fol-
lows: "A legitimate child cannot be adopted without the consent of
its parents, if living; .. .nor an illegitimate child without the con-
sent of its mother, if living; ....- 2 One of the factors considered by
the court in refusing to give the father "first right" was that the
mother did not give her permission for the adoption of the child by
its natural father.' To bolster its use and construction of the quoted
portion of California Civil Code § 224 the court cited In the Matter
of Adoption of Campbell. The Campbell court cited California
Civil Code § 224 and said that the "[C]ode section contains no
ambiguous language and requires no interpretation.. ."', referring
to the absence of any requirement that the father consent to adop-
tion by the grandmother. Campbell was cited by the Irby court to
show that the father's consent is not a statutory requirement in the
adoption of an illegitimate child.' In Irby, however, the father did
not contend that his consent was necessary, merely that he had a
right to be given first consideration in the adoption of his own child.
The court, however, apparently felt that the question of the father's
right of "first refusal" of an illegitimate child was identical to the
1 Although at the time of trial Jimmy attempted to show that he had complied with
the provisions of the statute and had thereby adopted his child, in effect he was
merely trying to block the adoption of his son by the Ellis family. In essence he
requested an opportunity to qualify under the statute before the final adoption by
the Ellis' made that course of action impossible. In such case CA1. CIV. CODE §
230 seems inapplicable, at least with regard to the right of "first refusal" since
adoption by the father was not really at issue.
2 226 Adv. Cal. App. at 307, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
3 Id. at 304-05, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
4 9 Cal. App. 2d 622, 51 P.2d 138 (1935). This case can be distinguished from
Irby. In Campbell the maternal grandmother and the natural father of an illegiti-
mate child wanted to adopt it. The natural mother was dead.
5 In the Matter of Adoption of Campbell, supra note 4, at 623, 51 P.2d at 139.
6 226 Adv. Cal. App. at 307, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 881-82.
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question of the father's consent.7 But it is submitted that the major
issue in Irby was whether the mother's consent was necessary for
Jimmy Bryant to adopt his son, and not whether the father's consent
was required for the Ellis' to adopt the child.
Apparently the Irby court gave considerable weight to the possi-
bility that to give the natural father the right of first refusal would
produce undesirable effects in future cases. That the final decision in
Irby was strongly influenced by this fear of future consequences is
shown by the court's statement: "A rule which would give the father
of an illegitimate child the right of 'first refusal' of the child would
create the possibility of grave abuses in adoption proceedings. The
market for babies is a seller's market."8 In support of this position
the court cited Comment, Moppets on the Market: The Problem of
Unregalated Adoptions, 59 YALE L.J. 715 (1950). An examination
of the cited article, coupled with a logical appraisal of the quoted
statement, does not identify any grave abuse which would constitute
an insuperable obstacle to granting the natural father a right of
"first refusal." Certainly the court could not have meant to intimate
that the recognition of such a right would cause unscrupulous ped-
dlers of babies to intentionally impregnate young maidens so that
they might perpetuate their heinous trade by ensuring a steady source
of the commodity! The court may have been implying that to grant
a right of "first refusal" to the natural father would place him in
a position to blackmail prospective adoptive parents who desperately
wanted the child. If so, it is difficult to believe that in a future case
presenting such a factual situation a court could not qualify the right
of "first refusal" rule, contended for by the father in Irby, to dis-
qualify a father who seemed to be engaging in unreasonably dilatory
tactics, or who approached the prospective parents with a 'deal.'
No additional statutes or cases were offered as authority in Irby.
The court's further arguments in substantiation of its decision may
7 Id. at 307-08, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 882. It should be noted that subsequent to the
1935 Campbell decision CAL. Civ. CODE § 24 has been amended, and the number
of situations in which the mothers consent to the adoption of an illegitimate
child is unnecessary has been increased. Cal. stats. 1939 ch. 463 §1. This is some
indication of a liberalization of the legislative intent which would seem to weaken
Campbell as authority upon which to base a valid construction of CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 224. The authority is further weakened by the fact that Campbell construed §
224 within a factual framework far different from that presented by Irby. See note
4 supra. Moreover, the Campbell court said only that the fathers claim of right
of preference was persuasive insofar as it states a general rule bearing on the
discretion of the court in adoption proceedings, but that it had no force in the
appellate court because the statutes did not limit the trial court's discretion, and
there had been no finding that the father was competent and suitable. 9 Cal. App.
2d at 624, 51 P.2d at 139.
8 226 Adv. Cal. App. at 307, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 882.
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be summarized as follows: first, the father was a minor and not in
a position to take care of and support the child; and second,
If it were held that the father... has the right to block the adop-
tion proceeding, the mother will be faced with a decision as to
whether she will raise the child herself or permit the father to have
its custody .... If the mother is forced to rear the child, her
chances of completing her education and of entering into a normal
happy marriage will be substantially diminished. 9
It is evident that the court used the singular facts of this particular
case to enunciate a very broad rule in the process of reaching a justi-
fiable decision.
The court's failure to quote California Civil Code § 224 more
extensively than it did is misleading. The court omitted portions of
the statute which provide that the consent of a father or mother is
not necessary if: first, the father or mother has been judicially de-
prived of, or has voluntarily in a judicial proceeding of another
jurisdiction, given up the custody of the child; second, where the
father or mother has deserted the child without provision for its
identification; or third, the father or mother of any child has relin-
quished said child for adoption as provided in California Civil Code
§ 224m, or has relinquished custody to a licensed or authorized
child-placing agency in another jurisdiction."
Section 224m should be examined further in light of the peculiar
factual situation presented by this case. If the mother had placed the
child for adoption with a licensed agency rather than with the Ellis
family, there would be no doubt that her consent would be unneces-
sary to authorize a subsequent adoption by whomever the agency
deemed fit. Having signed a written statement relinquishing her
child, her further consent to a subsequent adoption is not required.1
If a father tries to adopt his natural son after the child has been re-
linquished a licensed adoption agency, the mother's consent is not a
prerequisite if the father qualifies as a proper adoptive parent. Even
the natural mother's active opposition to the father's adoption of the
child would not prevent his doing so unless the relinquishment was
to be rescinded by the mutual consent of the mother and the adop-
tion agency. 2 The difference between this hypothetical situation and
the lrby case is that in Irby the mother gave the child to a private
couple for adoption rather than to a licensed adoption agency; yet
in the adoption agency situation described above the permission of
9 Id. at 308, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 882.
10 CAL. CV. CODE § 224.
"2 CA.. CIV. CODE § 224n.
12 CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 224m, 226a.
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the mother isn't required for the natural father to adopt, while in
the Irby situation her permission is required. In both cases the act of
the mother is a refusal on her part to continue her custody and care
of the child; in both cases the mother presumably intends that the
severance of the ties with her child shall be permanent and irrevo-
cable; in both cases the mother has indicated that she is giving up
all her rights to the child. The California Supreme Court in Adop-
tion of McDonald"8 said: "The right of a natural parent to refuse
consent is based on the natural affection between parent and child.
... Manifestly the same 'natural and sacred rights' are not present
when a child has been relinquished to an agency for adoption."' 14
The natural affection between parent and child is as lacking in the
case of a mother who relinquishes her child to private persons as it
is when she relinquishes it to a licensed agency, except for her select-
ing the new parents which guarantees that the father will not get
the child. In Irby, when Sue, the natural mother, put her child up
for adoption she was giving up her rights in the child in a direct
adoptive situation. She was complying, as far as her actions went,
with the provisions of law.1" One commentator has stated:
The right of parents permanently to dispose of their children, com-
pletely abdicating their rights and escaping their responsibilities, is
hardly to be counted as an aspect of the right to control and rear
them. In fact, it is precisely the opposite. It is an extinguishment of
the right. What biological parents do with their children when
they keep them is one thing; what they do with them when they
get rid of them is quite another. Parental renunciation of rights
and duties-whether through the independent or agency system-
is legitimized abandonment; .... 36
When Sue relinquished the child her role ceased, and her lack of
consent to subsequent efforts by the father to adopt the child, there-
fore, should have been of no moment since her consent was required
neither by logic nor statutory mandate. The plea of the natural
father for an opportunity to adopt should have been given some
weight. If the mother's consent is not pertinent after relinquishment
the case hinges on one question: should the natural father be afford-
ed an opportunity under the provisions of California Civil Code §
230 to adopt his child prior to giving the child to strangers, all other
facts being equal (which they admittedly were not in this case)?
To reach an answer the criteria for adoption should be examined.
The welfare of the child is to be considered in adoption proceed-
23 43 Cal. 2d 447, 274 P.2d 860 (1954).
14 Id. at 459, 274 P.2d at 867.
Is CAL. CIV. CODE § 224.
16 Jacobus tenBroek, Californids Adopion Law and Programs, 6 HAsTiNGs L.J. 261,
346 (1955).
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ings. 7 The Campbell court indicated that the natural father, in a
situation where his permission or preference is pertinent, is not
favored simply because of his status as the natural father."8 Indeed,
it has been said:
Under the facts of the case before us there can be no doubt that
when the mother's consent to adopt was executed the child was
illegitimate. All parental rights then existed solely in the child's
mother.... The natural father was then not even entitled to pref-
erence or special consideration in a proceeding by others to adopt
the child .... He had no existing or vested parental rights. He did
have certain inchoate rights of parenthood which would vest if he
elected to legitimate his child.19
In Adoption of Barnett" the Supreme Court of California expressly
disapproved of the cases wherein a preference for the natural father
was evident solely because of his status as such, by saying: "The
rule of strict construction of our adoption statutes in favor of the
natural parents. . . being inconsistent with the rationale of the deci-
sions of this court. . . as well as with Civil Code section 4, is dis-
approved."'" But no cases have been found in which the court has
favored strangers over the natural father when the natural father
from the time of the child's conception attempted to legitimate the
child, and to perform the functions of a father, but was prevented
from doing so by a mother who had turned her back not only on
him but also on the child. No case, that is, except Irby.
- Refusal to give the natural father a preference has not always
been the prevailing rule. Chief Justice Beatty, in a dissent in In the
Matter of Estate of Jessup 2 said that California Civil Code § 230
was:
[D]esigned to secure to innocent unfortunates in ... [the child's]
situation a just share of the rights to which they are by nature as
fully entitled as are legitimate offspring.... I think courts should
lean strongly in favor of a finding that the father of an illegitimate
child has done what every honest humane man should be not only
willing but eager to do ... [legitimate the child].23
An examination of the pertinent statutes shows that the law does
favor the natural father under certain conditions. The simplified
procedure prescribed by California Civil Code § 230 is available only
to fathers and constitutes an informal and inexpensive method
whereby a natural father may adopt his own child. The section ex-
17 Adoption of Lingol, 107 Cal. App. 2d 457, 237 P.2d 57 (1951).
28 9 Cal. App. 2d at 624, 51 P.2d at 139.
19 Adoption of Laws, 201 Cal. App. 2d 494, 500, 20 Cal. Rptr. 64, 67-68 (1962).
20 54 Cal. 2d 370, 354 P.2d 18, 6 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1960).
21 Id. at 378, 354 P.2d at 22-23, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 566.
22 81 Cal. 408, 22 Pac. 742 (1889).
23 Id. at 435, 22 Pac. at 750.
[Vol. 2
RECENT CASES
cludes all other persons, even if related. Even the Laws case, while
deprecating any preference for the natural father, hints that there
does exist some special relationship ("certain inchoate rights")
worthy of recognition.24 Under California Civil Code § 230, to adopt
his own illegitimate child the father merely has to acknowledge the
child as his own, receive it into his home, and treat it as his own.
By giving to the natural father alone such a short-cut method of
adoption it is evident that the Legislature recognized the existence
of some special relationship other than biological between the father
and the child. This statutory recognition should be construed to con-
stitute a legislative preference, despite the words of the Irby court.
If one assumes that the natural father does occupy some special
position with respect to his natural though illegitimate child, a posi-
tion recognized by logic and the Legislature, the weakness of the
Irby rule is evident. If one asks who has greater rights in the child,
the natural father or strangers to the child, other factors being equal,
the father must prevail. Speaking for the court, Justice (now Chief
Justice) Traynor said in McDonald:
The main purpose of adoption statutes is the promotion of the wel-
fare of children, bereft of the benefits of the home and care of
their real parents, by the legal recognition and regulation of the
consummation of the closest conceivable counterpart of the rela-
tionship of parent and child.25
What relationship could more closely resemble this "closest con-
ceivable counterpart of the relationship of parent and child" than
the relationship between a natural father and his own child? Is the
relationship between stranger and child more intimate, more natural,
more to be encouraged? If in some future case an affluent, deserving,
and responsible father who is capable of providing a fine home for
his child were to attempt to adopt his own child over the objections
of an immature and irresponsible mother who maliciously desired
to keep their illegitimate child out of the hands of the father, yet
refused to raise the child herself, the mischievous rule of Irby would
bar the father. The child in such case, under the Irby rule, would
suffer the loss of the love and care of his natural father, and might
also stand to lose the economic benefits of such a relationship, pos-
sibly including a substantial inheritance. Not only would justice be
refused the father in such case, but the welfare of the child might be
seriously affected.
In Irby the court could have enunciated a much narrower rule,
one more in keeping with the obvious legislative intent. Apparently
24 201 Cal. App. 2d at 500, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
25 43 Cal. 2d at 459, 274 P.2d at 867.
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the court in the first instance excluded Jimmy Bryant as a prospec-
tive adoptive parent for some cause or reason (not expressly iden-
tified in the record), and then enunciated a rule bolstering that deci-
sion. Though such ad hoc rules are reasonable within their peculiar
factual settings, they can result in future legal abuses when applied
mechanically to a different factual situation. On the facts presented
the Irby decision was probably valid and just, but one must view
with trepidation the prospective application of its broad rule.
It is submitted that the Irby court should have stated that when
the mother has relinquished the control and custody of her illegiti-
mate child the natural father, if a fit and proper parent under the
law, should preferentially be given the first opportunity under the
provisions of California Civil Code § 230 to adopt his own child.
The Irby court could, under such a rule, have found upon the facts
that Jimmy Bryant was not a fit and proper parent, and so reached
the correct result by way of a reasonable rule which would not be
as likely to create future injustice as the rule actually promulgated
by the court. A potentially mischievous rule need not be promul-
gated to afford protection against possible abuses when the discre-
tion of the courts may be relied upon to intelligently appraise the
facts and prevent the perpetration of the evil designs of a minority
of individuals who may in the future find themselves in the unfor-
tunate circumstances of Jimmy Bryant. In creating this rule, the Irby
court ignored a superior rule, the welfare of the child, which would
have achieved the same result.
Edward J. Leavitt
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